Incentive Efficiency of Correlated Equilibria with State Dependent Payoffs

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we extend the framework of a finite game to incorporate state dependent payoffs, prove the existence of a correlated equilibrium in such a set up and obtain a characterization of all incentive efficient correlated equilibria. Finally we prove the existence of correlated equilibria for games with state dependent preferences and single experimentation by the players and indicate a characterization of all incentive efficient equilibria for such games.

Date: 1990-08-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00966

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