Threat Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: This paper is a revised version based on two of my earlier papers Lahiri (1989c) and Lahiri (1990). For useful suggestions and discussions I am grateful to Jim Jordan, T.Parthasarathy, Prakash Chander, Arunava Sen and the participants of the 1990 International Conference of Game Theory and Its Applications to Economic held at Indian Statistical Institute (New Delhi). In particular this paper has benefited from the comments of Hans Peters and Mamoru Kaneko.

Date: 1990-12-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp00989

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (respub@iima.ac.in).