The Average Welfare Fair and Egaliterian Solutions for Bargaining Problems

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper e present an alternative characterization of the Egalitarian Solution for bargaining problems and show that the Egalitarian solution has the property that for any agent the incremental utility from bargaining is atleast as much as the average incremental utility of all other agents. Conversely, we show that any solution which is both weakly Pareto optimal and satisfies this latter property must be egalitarian.

Date: 1991-04-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp01003

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