Metric Rationalization of Bargaining Solutions and Respect for Unanimity

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we represent bargaining solutions by means of a metric which is defined on games, whereby the solutions are precisely those payoffs which are closest to being unanimously highest. Subsequently we study the properties of “welfare optimal rules” and rationalizability of bargaining solutions by symmetric metrics. This latter condition leads to anonymous bargaining solutions which satisfy “metric respect for unanimity”.

Date: 1991-10-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp01050

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().