The Non-Manipulability of the Utilitarian Solution

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we model threat bargaining problems as fixed threat bargaining games (with the threat point at the origin) and show that the utilitarian solution to threat bargaining problems is not manipulable.

Date: 1992-10-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp01138

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