Restricted Expansion Independence for Choice Problems

Somdeb Lahiri

IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: In this paper we propose restricted expansion independence as a criterion which may be satisfied by desirable choice functions and axiomatically characterize the proportional solution by using this criterion. We also show that the proportional solution satisfies an improvement sensitivity property on a reasonable domain. The theory of solutions to choice problems is used in the paper to define solutions for coalitional bargaining problems.

Date: 1995-02-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iim:iimawp:wp01309

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