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Axiomatic Characterizations of Some Solutions for Abstract Games

Somdeb Lahiri

No WP2000-02-02, IIMA Working Papers from Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department

Abstract: An abiding problem in choice theory has been one of characterizing those choice functions which are obtained as a result of some kind of optimization. Specifically, the endeavour has concentrated largely on finding a binary relation (if there be any) whose best elements coincide with observed choices. An adequate survey of this line of research till the mid eighties is available in Moulin [1985]. More recently, the emphasis has focused on binary relations defined on non-empty subsets of a given set, such that the choice function coincides with the best subset corresponding to a feasible set of alternatives. This problem has been provided with a solution in Lahiri [1999], although the idea of binary relations defined on subsets is a concept which owes its analytical origins to Pattanaik and Xu [1990]. The idea of a function which associates with each set and a binary relation a non-empty subset of the given set has a long history whose exact origin is very difficult to specify and in any case is unknown to the author. In Laslier [1997] can be found a very exhaustive survey of the related theory when binary relations are reflexive, complete and anti-symmetric.

Date: 2000-02-02
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