The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS
We analyze the migrant smuggling market where smugglers differ in their capacities to exploit their clients' labor in the destination. We show that when exploitation capacities are private information, the equilibrium may be characterized by adverse selection. In such a case, policies that diminish the availability of smuggling services to potential migrants inevitably raise the mean exploitation of smuggled labor.
Keywords: migrant smuggling; migrant exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Migrant smuggling (2010)
Working Paper: Migrant Smuggling (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp207
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