Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry

Ronald Davies and Carsten Eckel

The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS

Abstract: This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount of labor needed to cover fixed costs. Because tax competition affects the distribution of firms, it affects both relative equilibrium wages across countries and equilibrium prices. These in turn influence the equilibrium number of firms. From the social planner's perspective, optimal tax rates are harmonized, providing the optimal number of firms, and set such that income is efficiently distributed between private and public consumption. As is common in tax competition models, in the Nash equilibrium tax rates are inefficiently low, yielding underprovision of public goods. Furthermore, there exist a variety of situations in which equilibrium tax rates differ. As a result, too many firms enter the market as governments compete to be the low-tax, high-wage country. This illustrates a new distortion from tax competition and provides an additional benefit from tax harmonization.

Keywords: Tax Competition; Foreign Direct Investment; Tax Harmonization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry (2010)
Working Paper: Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry (2010)
Working Paper: Tax Competition for Heterogeneous Firms with Endogenous Entry (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp214

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