Balancing Competing Demands: Position-Taking and Election Proximity in the European Parliament

Rene Lindstadt, Jonathan B. Slapin & Ryan J. Vander Wielen

The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series from IIIS

Abstract: Parties value unity, yet, members of parliament face competing demands, giving them incentives to deviate from the party. For members of the European Parliament (MEPs), these competing demands are national party and European party group pressures. Here, we look at how MEPs respond to those competing demands. We examine ideological shifts within a single parliamentary term to assess how European Parliament (EP) election proximity a ects party group cohesion. Our formal model of legislative behavior with multiple principals yields the following hypothesis: When EP elections are proximate, national party delegations shift toward national party positions, thus weakening EP party group cohesion. For our empirical test, we analyze roll call data from the fth EP (1999-2004) using Bayesian item response models. We nd signi cant movement among national party delegations as EP elections approach, which is consistent with our theoretical model, but surprising given the existing literature on EP elections as second-order contests.

Date: 2009
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