Collusion among Helath Insures in Chile: Good, Bad and Ugly Reasons in a Split Decision

Claudio Agostini, Manuel Willington and Eduardo Saavedra

ILADES-UAH Working Papers from Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business

Abstract: We analyze in this paper the TDLC’s ruling in an antitrust case against five health insurance providers (“Isapres”) in Chile, accused of colluding to reduce the coverage on the health insurance plans they offer. The TDLC is a court of appeals specialized in free competition and composed of a combination of economists and lawyers. We considers the fact that the system to be followed by the TDLC to assess the proof is the rule of reason, which requires the judges to assess the evidence based on their experience, formal rules of logic, and economic theory. Likewise, TDLC judges are obliged to explain and justify their judgments with not only their appreciation of the proof, but also an account of all the evidence submitted. We hold that the TDLC judgment is precise and correct in some disputed points, but the majority decision has essential errors that ultimately led to the acquittal of the accused Isapres. Regarding the final Supreme Court verdict, most of the judges based their decision on the lack of explicit collusion evidence, dismissing the use of indirect collusion evidence. The minority judges, however, stated that the evidence of implicit collusion was sufficient to condemn the Isapres.

JEL-codes: K21 K41 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-06
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