Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
Takashi Kunimoto and
Roberto Serrano ()
No 2007-14, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents\' payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes our reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine, allows us to obtain very permissive results. Our first result is that generically, if there are at least three alternatives, any incentive compatible social choice function is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. Further, we characterize robust virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by means of incentive compatibility and measurability. Our characterization is independent of the presence of monetary transfers or assumptions alike, made in previous studies. Our work also clarifies the measurability condition in connection to the generic diversity of preferences used in our first result.
Keywords: Wilson doctrine; mechanism design; robust virtual implementation; iteratively undominated strategies; incentive compatibility; measurability; type diversity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to repec.imdea.org:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)
Working Paper: Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-14
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IMDEA RePEc Maintainer ().