Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders?

Steven Phillips and Timothy Lane

No 2002/003, IMF Economic Issues from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Examines the issue of moral hazard inrelation to IMF loans to countries in financial difficulties. Concerns about moral hazard have had a prominent place in recent discussions on how the architecture of the international financial system should be reformed and what the IMF’s role should be.

Keywords: EI; financing; investor; yield; lending; market; IMF press; financing package; liquidity position; IMF action; IMF guarantee; financial support; Moral hazard; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Systemically important financial institutions; Yield curve; Asia and Pacific (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2002-05-03
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