Accountability Arrangements for Financial Sector Regulators

Eva Hüpkes, Michael Taylor and Marc Quintyn

No 2006/003, IMF Economic Issues from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Policymakers are often reluctant to grant independence to the agencies that regulate and supervise the financial sector because of the fear that these agencies, with their wide-ranging responsibilities and powers, could become a law unto themselves. This pamphlet describes mechanisms for making regulatory agencies accountable not only to the government but also to the industry they supervise and the public at large, with examples from a range of countries.

Keywords: EI; RSA; independence; RSAS' mandate; committee; RSA independence; oversight authority; minister of finance; agency independence; prime minister; executive branch; Bank supervision; Financial sector stability; Financial stability assessment; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2006-03-14
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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