Limiting Central Bank Credit to the Government: Theory and Practice

Carlo Cottarelli

No 1993/008, IMF Occasional Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper examines central bank independence with reference to the constraints on central bank credit to the government, focusing on how such credit should be regulated. It discusses why credit should be contsrained, and in which forms, and how to implement those constraints.

Keywords: OP; government; independence; central bank; central bank vis-à-vis; central bank credit; inflation performance; market rate; GDP ratio; Central bank credit; Credit; Securities; Bank deposits; Current account; Caribbean; West Africa; Europe; government market interest rate; central bank grant; central bank's independence; members of the European Community; Monetary base; Central bank autonomy; Monetary expansion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62
Date: 1993-09-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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