Fiscal Policy Rules

George Kopits and Steven Symansky

No 1998/011, IMF Occasional Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: What are fiscal policy rules? What are the principal benefits and drawbacks associated with various fiscal rules, particularly compared with alternative approaches to fiscal adjustment? Can fiscal rules contribute to long-run sustainability and welfare without sacrificing short-run stabilization? If so, what characteristics of fiscal rules make this contribution most effective? And in what circumstances and contexts, if any should the IMF encourage its member countries to adopt fiscal rules? This paper seeks to identify sensible fiscal policy rules that can succeed, if chosen by a member country, as an alternative to descretionary fiscal rules.

Keywords: OP; fiscal policy rule; government; rule; deficit; balanced-budget rule; no-deficit rule; debt rule; member government; Fiscal rules; Government debt management; Budget planning and preparation; Fiscal consolidation; Europe; Global; Western Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 1998-07-22
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (241)

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