Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention

Eduardo Borensztein, Olivier Jeanne, Paolo Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer and Marcos Chamon ()

No 2005/001, IMF Occasional Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: The debate on government debt in the context of possible reforms of the international financial architecture has thus far focused on crisis resolution. This paper seeks to broaden this debate. It asks how government debt could be structured to pursue other objectives, including crisis prevention, international risk-sharing, and facilitating the adjustment of fiscal variables to changes in domestic economic conditions. To that end, the paper considers recently developed analytical approaches to improving sovereign debt structure using existing instruments, and reviews a number of proposals--including the introduction of explicit seniority and GDP-linked instruments--in the sovereign context.

Keywords: OP; debt; short-term debt; emerging market country; debt structures; bond; GDP-indexed bond; inflation-indexed debt; debt structure; Emerging and frontier financial markets; Bonds; Natural disasters; Local currency debt; Global; Africa; Asia and Pacific (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69
Date: 2005-01-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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