The Too-Important-to-Fail Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve

Inci Ötker-Robe (inci.otkerrobe@me.com), Aditya Narain, Anna Ilyina and Jay Surti

No 2011/012, IMF Staff Discussion Notes from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: DISCLAIMER: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Keywords: SDN; Basel; SIFIs; bank; market; financial stability forum; Financial crises; financial stability; too big to fail; too important to fail; moral hazard; resolution; financial regulation; bank capital; contingent capital; bail-in; supervision; market discipline; externalities SIFIs; equity capital; capital base; nonbank SIFIs; capital surcharge; Basel capital requirement; bank risk-management system; FSB recommendation; nonviable SIFIs; bank funding; Systemically important financial institutions; Bank resolution framework; Systemic risk; Global (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2011-05-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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