From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial Institutions

Virginia Rutledge, Michael Moore, Marc Dobler, Wouter Bossu, Nadège Jassaud and Jianping Zhou

No 2012/003, IMF Staff Discussion Notes from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: Staff Discussion Notes showcase the latest policy-related analysis and research being developed by individual IMF staff and are published to elicit comment and to further debate. These papers are generally brief and written in nontechnical language, and so are aimed at a broad audience interested in economic policy issues. This Web-only series replaced Staff Position Notes in January 2011.

Keywords: SDN; bail-in power; bail-in capital; bail-in framework; bail-in proposal; bail-in regime; Financial regulatory reforms; banking crisis; bailout; too big to fail; bank capitalization; statutory bail-in; bail-in mechanism; equity position; bank-resolution measure; unsecured debt; Bank resolution framework; Creditor bail-in; Debt restructuring; Distressed institutions; Systemically important financial institutions; Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2012-04-24
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