Managerial delegation under network effects

Trishita Bhattacharjee () and Rupayan Pal
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Trishita Bhattacharjee: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This paper shows that network effects do not have any implication to the nature of the equilibrium strategic managerial delegation under Cournot type quantity competition, unlike as in the case of Bertrand type price competition a la Hoernig (2012). It also shows that delegation of output/price decision to the manager is optimal for the owner even in the case of monopoly in the product market, due to the existence of network effects. The monopolist offers sales-oriented incentive scheme to her manager in equilibrium, if there is network effect.

Keywords: Strategic delegation; Network effects; Quantity competition; Monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2013-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2013-003

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