The Political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh
Megan Sheahan (),
Yanyan Liu (),
Christopher Barrett () and
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Megan Sheahan: Cornell University
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India
Are ostensibly demand-driven public programs less susceptible to political clientelism even when private goods are allocated? We investigate this conjecture using expenditure data at the local level from India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. By focusing on one state where accountability and transparency mechanisms have been employed and implementation efforts have been applauded, we do not find evidence of blatant vote buying before the 2009 election but do find that patronage played a small part in fund distribution after the 2009 election. Indeed most variation in expenditure is explained by the observed needs of potential benficiaries, as the scheme intended.
Keywords: India; political economy; clientelism; project allocation; employment guarantee (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H41 H42 H53 H54 I38 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ger and nep-pbe
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Working Paper: The Political Economy of MGNREGS Spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
Working Paper: The political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2014-030
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