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Signaling through public antitrust enforcement: A Generalization

Madhuparna Ganguly () and Rupayan Pal
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Madhuparna Ganguly: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This note shows that the argument of Saljanin(2017) [Saljanin, 2017. "Signaling through public antitrust enforcement" , Economics Letters 169, 4 - 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in antitrust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests.

Keywords: Private and public enforcement; Signaling; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H1 H4 K1 L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-com
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Working Paper: Signaling through Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Generalization (2018) Downloads
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