EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Competitive equilibria and robust efficiency with club goods

Anuj Bhowmik and Japneet Kaur ()
Additional contact information
Japneet Kaur: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: The paper establishes an equivalence theorem (which states that an allocation is a club equilibrium allocation if and only if it is robustly efficient) in a setting where individuals not only trade private goods but can choose to become members of a finite number of clubs, where each club is defined by the external characteristics of its participants and the project in which they are involved. Here competitive equilibrium allocations are characterized using the veto power of the set of all agents, i.e. rather than considering the blocking power of multiple coalitions, we only take the coalition comprising all agents and study its blocking power in a group of economies attained by slightly modifying each agent's initial endowment.

Keywords: Club goods; Robustly efficient allocations; core-Walras equivalence; Walrasian equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D51 D60 D61 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2022-014.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2022-014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamprasad M. Pujar ().

 
Page updated 2025-02-01
Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2022-014