EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Cross-ownership in duopoly: Are there any incentives to divest?

Rupayan Pal and Emmanuel Petrakis

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This paper shows that in a duopoly a firm has no incentives to divest its passive shares in its rival when firms' strategies are strategic complements. This holds independently whether goods are substitutes or complements and whether firms engage in simultaneous or sequential move product market competition. However, if firms' strategies are strategic substitutes and are engaged in simultaneous move competition, it is optimal for both firms to fully divest their shares in their rivals under a private placement mechanism via independent intermediaries or under competitive bidding. Yet, in the sequential move game only the follower has such incentives. Notably, under a private placement mechanism via a common intermediary, there are circumstances under which there are partial or no firms' divestment incentives, highlighting that the divestment mechanism employed by firms may have a crucial role on their divestment incentives.

Keywords: Cross-ownership; passive shares; strategic substitutes and complements; divestment incentives; market competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L2 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2024-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2024-003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2024-003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Shamprasad M. Pujar ().

 
Page updated 2024-06-21
Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2024-003