Information Avoidance, Selective Exposure, and Fake(?) News-A Green Market Experiment
Katharina Momsen () and
Markus Ohndorf ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
We investigate if people exploit moral wiggle room in green markets when revelation is stochastic and the revealed information is potentially erroneous. In our laboratory experiment, subjects purchase products associated with co-benefits represented as a contribution to carbon o?sets purchased by the experimenters. Information on the size of this contribution is unobservable at first, but can be actively revealed by the consumer. In seven treatments, we alter the information structure as well as the perceived revelation costs. We find strong evidence of self-serving information avoidance in treatments with simple stochastic revelation and reduced reliability of the information, representing potentially 'fake' news. The propensity to avoid information increases with the introduction of nominal information costs, which are in fact not payo?-relevant. We conclude that, generally, self-serving information avoidance can arise in green market situations if specific situational excuses are present, which could explain the demand for products associated with 'greenwashing'.
Keywords: Information avoidance; experiment; carbon o?sets; moral wiggle room; green consumption; fake news (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 G11 G41 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-18
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