Status and Reputation Nudging
Julia Rose (),
Michael Kirchler () and
Stefan Palan ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
Status and reputation concerns are conjectured to be important especially in markets with information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, such as in credence goods markets. To investigate the effects of status and reputation on reciprocal behavior of sales personnel in a financial credence goods market, we run a natural field experiment. We send e-mail requests to insurance brokers asking for an appointment. We find that status nudging and, with a larger effect size, reputation nudging in the e-mails increase brokers' response rates compared to a neutral request. Both effects are robust across all responses, only counting affirmative responses, and in urban and rural areas.
Keywords: Insurance brokers; natural field experiment; credence goods; status; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 G41 G22 D12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ias
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Working Paper: Status and Reputation Nudging (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-20
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