The role of diagnostic ability in markets for expert services
Fang Liu (),
Alexander Rasch (),
Marco Schwarz and
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Experts may exploit their informational advantage by defrauding customers. Market institutions have been shown theoretically to be effective in mitigating fraudulent expert behavior. We analyze whether this positive result carries over to when experts are heterogeneous in their diagnostic abilities. We find that efficient market outcomes are always possible. However, inefficient equilibria can also exist. When such inefficient equilibria are played, a larger share of high-ability experts can lead to more inefficiencies relative to the efficient equilibria.
Keywords: Credence good; Diagnosis; Expert; Fraud; Overtreatment; Undertreatment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Janette Walde ().