Unequal Opportunities, Social Groups, and Redistribution
Rene Schwaiger (),
Jürgen Huber (),
Michael Kirchler (),
Daniel Kleinlercher () and
Utz Weitzel ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
In this paper, we investigate the role of unequal opportunities and social group membership in preferences for redistribution. We present results from a large-scale online experiment with more than 4,000 participants. The experiment features a real-effort task and a subsequent dictator game with native Germans and immigrants to Germany. We find that dictator transfers are higher under unequal opportunities than under equal opportunities in the real-effort task. Furthermore, different from native dictators, who transfer equal amounts to both groups, immigrant dictators transfer more to in-group than to out-group receivers under unequal opportunities. Finally, we show that political preferences partly explain transfer behavior.
Keywords: online experiment; redistribution; fairness; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 G11 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-26
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