On the Robustness of Social Norm Elicitation
Christian König-Kersting ()
Working Papers from Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck
We study the robustness of Krupka and Weber's method (2013) for eliciting social norms. In two experiments with more than 1200 participants, we find that participants' response patterns are invariant to differences in the salience of the monetarily incentivized coordination aspect. We further demonstrate that asking participants for their personal first and second order beliefs without monetary incentives results in qualitatively identical responses. In addition, we observe that participants give sensible responses whether or not they understand the task or their monetary incentives. Overall, Krupka and Weber's method produces remarkably robust response patterns.
Keywords: social norms; incentives; beliefs; task comprehension; robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-soc and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inn:wpaper:2021-02
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