Asymmetric Payoffs in Simultaneous and Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Games

T.K. Ahn (), Myungsuk Lee (), Lore Ruttan () and James Walker
Additional contact information
T.K. Ahn: Florida State University
Myungsuk Lee: Sung Kyun Kwan University
Lore Ruttan: Emory University

No 2006-003, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: We investigate the role of payoff asymmetry in laboratory prisoner’s dilemma games. Symmetric and Asymmetric games are examined in simultaneous and sequential settings. In the asymmetric/sequential games, we study the impact of having payoff advantaged players moving either first or second. Asymmetry reduces the rates of cooperation in simultaneous games. In sequential games, asymmetry interacts with order of play such that the rate of cooperation is highest when payoff disadvantaged players move first. The presence of an exit option increases cooperation by the players who choose to play the game when payoffs are symmetric, or when payoffs are asymmetric and the payoff disadvantaged player moves first.

Keywords: cooperation; prisoner’s dilemma; heterogeneity; exit option (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2005-08, Revised 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games (2007)
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