Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Karl-Martin Ehrhart (),
Roy Gardner,
Juergen von Hagen and
Claudia Keser ()
Additional contact information
Karl-Martin Ehrhart: University of Karlsruhe
Claudia Keser: IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
No 2006-009, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington
Abstract:
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level.
Keywords: budget processes; voting equilibrium; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2006-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence (2007) 
Working Paper: Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2006) 
Working Paper: Budget processes: theory and experimental evidence (2004) 
Working Paper: Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2004)
Working Paper: Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence (2001) 
Working Paper: Budget processes: Theory and experimental evidence (2000) 
Working Paper: Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence (1999) 
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