Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

George von Furstenberg

No 2008-005, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

Keywords: Overpromising; international agreements; treaty compliance; performance measurement; politics and environment; Kyoto Protocol (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2008-04
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https://caepr.indiana.edu/RePEc/inu/caeprp/caepr2008-005.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes (2008)
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