On the Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms in General Quasi-linear Environments

Yu Chen ()
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Yu Chen: Indiana University

No 2014-001, CAEPR Working Papers from Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington

Abstract: This paper generalizes the Myerson (1981)'s characterization results of incentive compatible mechanisms and optimal incentive compatible mechanisms in general quasi-linear multi-agency situations with more abstract payoff function forms and constraint sets. Both Bayesian implementation and ex post implementation are addressed. In this paper the characterization results are also applied to comparison and equivalence between EPIC and BIC mechanisms, strategic dominance of centralized mechanisms over decentralized menus, and optimal (full) surplus extraction.

Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism; ex post incentive compatible mechanism; quasi-linear environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ger, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inu:caeprp:2014001

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