Analysing Performance-Based Financing through the Lenses of the Principal-Agent Theory

Dimitri Renmans, Elisabeth Paul and Bruno Dujardin

No 2016.14, IOB Working Papers from Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB)

Abstract: We approach Performance-Based Financing (PBF) through the lenses of the Principal-Agent theory to critically analyse PBF and elucidate the principal elements, main challenges and possible pitfalls. We discern a framework comprised of eight dimensions: context and other stakeholders, main principals (government, donors, purchasing agency), verification officers, agents (health providers), the PBF contract, benefitting principals (patients), positive and negative effects, and costs and benefits. Moreover, PBF is seen as a package of choices over six elements: governance arrangements, matrix of indicators, monitoring and evaluation arrangements, financial incentive arrangements, dispute settlement mechanism, and ancillary components. We advise the use of ‘theory-based evaluations’ (TBE) to advance our knowledge on PBF. The proposed framework acts as a good starting point for TBE, given its comprehensiveness and reference to an established theory.

Keywords: performance-based financing; PBF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://medialibrary.uantwerpen.be/oldcontent/cont ... ns-Paul-Dujardin.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iob:wpaper:201614

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IOB Working Papers from Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans De Backer ().