Increasingly wageless? The political economy of salary supplements in the Congolese civil service

Stylianos Moshonas, Tom De Herdt, Kristof Titeca and Paulin Balungwe Shamavu

No 2024.09, IOB Working Papers from Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB)

Abstract: This paper examines the fragmented and informalised system of salary supplements in the Congolese civil service, analysing their drivers, their distribution across ministries and their impact on governance. Based on extensive fieldwork, it shows how these supplements shape the political economy of remuneration and the internal dynamics of the public bureaucracy.

Keywords: DR Congo; DRC; civil service; salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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