Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance

Claudio Sapelli and Bernardita Vial

No 195, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: In Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).

Keywords: Insurance; moral hazard; adverse selection; self selection; count data models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 G22 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as "Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance", Journal of Health Economics, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2003, pp. 459-476.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:195

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