Markets for Environmental Protection; Desing and Performance

Juan-Pablo Montero

No 269, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: Policy makers in different parts of the world are paying more attention to environmental markets (i.e., tradeable emission permits markets) as an alternative to the traditional command-and-command control approach of setting uniform emission and technology standards. I extend the basic (perfect information) model of a permits market to accommodate for practical considerations including regulator's asymmetric information on firms' costs, uncertainty on benefits from pollution control, incomplete enforcement, incomplete monitoring of emissions and the possibility of voluntary participation of non-affected sources. Implications for instrument design and implementation are provided.

Keywords: Environmental regulation; permits markets; asymmetric information; incomplete enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Published as "Markets for Environmental Protection: Design and Performance", Estudios de Economía Vol. 31, Nº 1, pp. 79-99, 2004.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:269

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