Is workplace safety everybody's business? Experimental evidence on prevention information, accidents and compensating wage differentials in SMEs

Francisco Brahm, Jeanne Lafortune and José Tessada

No 508, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: We randomly distributed safety-related information treatments to SMEs –three to the firm manager and one to the firm workers. We find that only information provided to workers leads to a large and lasting decrease in accidents and increased prevention. It also leads to an interesting wage response: wages fall but only after accidents drop. Further analysis indicates convincing presence of a compensating wage differential, much larger than hedonic estimates. Whom to inform appears to matter since workers seem to be more responsive and be willing to pay for increased safety through wages.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:508

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