The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations

Felipe González, Mounu Prem and Francisco Urzúa I.

No 516, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: We show how the sale of state owned firms in dictatorships may lead to the creation of political corporations operating in democracies. Using several novel datasets, we characterize the privatizations of the Pinochet regime in Chile using a data driven algorithm, confirming that some state owned firms were sold underpriced to politically connected individuals. We then show how firms with crooked privatization processes grew and benefited from Pinochet and in democracy formed political connections, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These results reveal how authoritarian regimes can influence a subsequent democracy and document a way in which political corporations are created.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_516.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_516.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_516.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations: Evidence from the Pinochet Regime (2020)
Working Paper: The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations (2019)
Working Paper: The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:516

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jaime Casassus ().