Do you like me enough? The impact of restricting preferences ranking in a university matching process

Nicolás Figueroa, Jeanne Lafortune and Alejandro Sáenz

No 518, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the impact of imposing preferences-on-preferences (POP) within the context of a deferred-acceptance matching process with uncertainty. Theoretically, this type of rules make students misrepresent their preferences to secure a spot in a POP program, particularly when uncertainty is large. Applicants to Chilean universities responded as predicted by our model to a 2003 policy where one of the main university, UChile, imposed POP and then to a change in the entrance exam, increasing uncertainty. We show that not only were applications altered but eventual outcomes and welfare as well, particularly with higher uncertainty.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_518.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (https://www.economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_518.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://economia.uc.cl/docs/doctra/dt_518.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:518

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jaime Casassus ().