Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?

Francisco Silva

No 538, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: I compare two di/erent systems of provision of binary public goods: a centralized system, ruled by a benevolent dictator who has limited commitment power; and a decentralized system, based on voluntary contributions, where agents can communicate but cannot write contracts. I show that any ex-post individually rational allocation that is implementable by the centralized system is also imple mentable by the decentralized system. This suggests that when the public good provision problem is merely an informational one, as is the case with binary public goods, a decentralized system may perform better.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit? (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:538

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