An informational Ponzi-scheme

Francisco Silva

No 539, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: I show how "experts" who have no intrinsic ability or knowledge are able to sustain a permanent reputation that they do, even in a world where agents have rational expectations and access to an unlimited amount of data about the experts predicting ability. The claim of having such knowledge attracts clients to the expert, allowing the expert to have access to the inside information they provide. That information can then be used by the expert to back up that claim.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:539

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