Punishing Mayors Who Fail the Test: How do Voters Respond to Information on Educational Outcomes?

Loreto Cox, Sylvia Eyzaguirre, Francisco Gallego and Maximiliano García

No 555, Documentos de Trabajo from Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Abstract: This paper explores the role of providing information on the educational outcomes of municipal schools to voters on their electoral behavior in elections in which the incumbent mayor is running for reelection in Chile. We designed and implemented a randomized experiment whereby we sent 128,033 letters to voters with: (i) information on past test scores for local public schools (levels and changes), and (ii) different yardsticks, specifically the average and maximum test scores for comparable municipalities. We find that providing information of the relative performance affects turnout, which translates almost one-to-one into votes for the incumbent mayor, and produces spillovers on the election of local councilors. Results are concentrated in polling stations where most voters had already participated in previous elections. They are especially strong when educational results are bad and in stations that had stronger support for the incumbent mayor in the previous election, reducing turnout and thus votes for the incumbent.

Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ioe:doctra:555

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