On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenaël Piaser

No 2015-632, Working Papers from Department of Research, Ipag Business School

Abstract: We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of standard incentive compatible mechanisms in these contexts. First, we provide a clarifying example showing how incentive compatible mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling equilibria are robust against unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms. We then consider the single agent case and exhibit sufficient conditions for the validity of the revelation principle.

Keywords: Competing Mechanisms; Exclusive Competition; Incomplete Information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition (2018)
Working Paper: On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition (2018)
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