Pledge and implement bargaining in the Paris Agreement on climate change

Alejandro Caparrós

No 2003, Working Papers from Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC

Abstract: This paper analyzes a multilateral bargain game motivated by the Paris Agreement on climate change. Countries submit pledges, which can be revoked although this implies reputational costs. Pledges, which do not need to be accepted by other countries, detail intended abatement efforts and can be conditional or unconditional, according to whether they depend on transfers. As the process is repeated, incomplete long-term provisions are also considered. The analysis shows the conditions under which, despite its weakness, the Paris Agreement can bring the world to the first best, or at least closer. It also details how to improve the current agreement.

Keywords: Bargaining Theory; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Global Warming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2003

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