The patronage effect: a theoretical perspective of patronage and political selection
Federico Quaresima and
Fabio Fiorillo ()
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Fabio Fiorillo: Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona
Working papers from Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica
This article investigates the patronage phenomenon under a theoret- ical point of view. Legislative dissent could have damaging effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party for re- election, which in turn partially depends on its reputation of cohesiveness. Nevetheless dissent allows the legislator to build a good reputation with local constituents for re-election sake. Then parties may sometimes bene- fit from tolerating some level of dissent. As a result the party has a double goal. It should require the maximum loyalty from legislators, not ignoring the legislators' reputation with the voters. In this paper we consider pa- tronage as an additional tool for the party to calibrate parlamentarians' loyalty towards the party itself and towards constituencies.
Keywords: Patronage; political selection; exit strategy; bureaucracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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