The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States
Daniel Albalate (),
Germà Bel () and
R. Richard Geddes ()
Additional contact information
R. Richard Geddes: Department of Policy Analysis & Management, College of Human Ecology, Cornell University
No 201220, IREA Working Papers from University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics
Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect “stand alone” versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation..
Keywords: Privatization, Contracting, Infrastructure, Risk transfer. JEL classification: H4; H54; H7; L88; L9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-ppm and nep-tre
Date: 2012-12, Revised 2012-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ira:wpaper:201220
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IREA Working Papers from University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alicia García ().