Private management and strategic bidding behavior in electricity markets: Evidence from Colombia
Carlos Suarez ()
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Carlos Suarez: Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economics, Research Group on Governments and Markets, University of Barcelona, Avinguda Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Tower 6 Floor 3. Engineering Department, Research Group on Energy, Environment and Development, Jorge Tadeo Lozano University.
No 202102, IREA Working Papers from University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics
In this paper I undertake a policy evaluation of the impact of the switch from public to private management of electricity generation units on their price bidding strategies. I draw on information about the bidding strategies of units in the Colombian electricity market to perform a double difference analysis. The evidence observed is coherent with theoretical behavioral predictions for profit maximizing agents facing short positions in forward contracts.
Keywords: Electricity Markets; Market Power; Privatization; Mixed Oligopoly; Double Differences. JEL classification: L13; L94; C10. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2021-01, Revised 2021-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ira:wpaper:202102
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