An Economic Approach to Analyzing Civil War

Stergios Skaperdas

No 60715, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: Civil wars and conflict can be understood from an economic point of view only if there is incomplete contracting. I examine such settings and first discuss sources of incomplete contracting, from geography and ethnic and social distance to external interventions due to geopolitics or the presence of rents. Yet, since war is destructive, the contending parties might normally be expected to settle in the shadow of war. One reason that sometimes they do not, contrary to conventional wisdom, is because the shadow of the future is too long. Subsequently, using a formal model for guidance I examine some consequences of civil wars and emphasize the role hierarchical organization and rents play in determining the severity of conflict.

Keywords: Warlords; Incomplete contracting; Conflict; Appropriation; Anarchy; Shadow of the future (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F5 H56 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2007-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An economic approach to analyzing civil wars (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:060715

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