Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions

Amihai Glazer and Hiroki Kondo (kondo@shinshu-u.ac.jp)
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Hiroki Kondo: Department of Economics, Shinshu University

No 70807, Working Papers from University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider cities which can increase the income of landowners or of capital owners by improving the quality of public services. The improvement can come from innovation or from imitation. We find that when cities aim to benefit landowners, too many cities innovate; but too few cities innovate when the city aims to benefit capital owners. Redistribution across cities can ameliorate these inefficiencies.

Keywords: Tax competition; Innovation; Interjurisdictional differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H73 R13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:irv:wpaper:070807

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